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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
ROBERT E. JONES,
Defendant/
Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 890533
Category 1

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEDURES
This is the Reply Brief of Appellant filed pursuant to
Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals*

ARGUMENT
Defendant agrees that the two-prong test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.
Ct. 2052 (1984), addressing the issue of ineffectiveness of
counsel, applies in this case.
previously:

Those prongs are, as indicated

(1) a showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to
Defendant by the Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, and
that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and (2) a
showing of a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different but for counsels
-4-

unprofessional errors; reasonable probability being defined as
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence of the
outcome*

Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686; 80 L.Ed.2d, at 692.
Defendant argues that the standards set forth in

Strickland have been met.

Points one and two of Appellantvs

Brief meet the Strickland test.

When combined with the other

three points, it is apparent that Defendant was not represented
competently, and that there is at least reasonable probability
that, but for prior counsels efforts, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

The balance of Defendants brief will briefly address
several issues raised in the Respondents Brief.

ISSUES/ARGUMENT
Issue One
FAILURE TO MAKE CLAIM AGAINST " CO-COUNSEL" , LeROY
JOHNSON.
Defendant was granted his Pre-Trial Motion to hire
Ginger Fletcher by the Trial Court after determination

was made

that there may have been a conflict of interest with the Weber
County Public Defender attorneys.

Ms. Flether was hired by the

County to represent Defendant at Defendants request.
Defendant had no knowledge or input into the hiring of
LeRoy Johnson, and felt throughout the proceeding that Mr.
Johnson was simply an assistant to Ms. Fletcher.
-5-

At no time did

he consider LeRoy Johnson to be his attorney.

Ms. Fletcher hired

Mr. Johnson at Johnson's request to gain experience as an
attorney by assisting Fletcher in the case.
Issue Two
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY/MENTAL CONDITION.
The State, for the most part, takes great license in
interpreting the testimony of Dr. Alma Carlisle.

Defendant urges

the Court to review the record citations contained in State's
brief, pages 8 and 9, and compare Dr. Carlisle's actual
statements with the State's interpretations contained in the
State's brief.
Defendant contends that though there is certainly room
for interpretation, a jury would have been at least concerned and
at most persuaded that Defendant's mental capacity was lacking
below the level necessary for conviction of a capital offense.
Dr. Carlisle testified that:
"...being a multiple is different from being a whole
person. And the whole person may decide to commit a
certain crime and his thought process may be very
consistent all the way through, from the beginning to
the end. Thus, there seems to be more responsibility
for that individual than for a multiple, who is, to a
degree, out of control.n
(R./ 2718.)
The State has also attempted to gloss over the fact
that there was no expert testimony received at either of
Defendant's trials in this matter.

As the State suggests, many

witnesses testified at his first trial regarding his changing
personality and extensive history of mental health treatment.
-6~

(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-34).

However, the State further

erroneously suggests that because such testimony failed in the
first trial, it was reasonable strategy not to raise the issue of
Defendant's mental health at the second trial.

The State forgets

that in Defendant's first trial there was no expert testimony
elicited regarding Defendant's diagnosed mental illnesses due to
the fact that no such diagnoses were made until he was
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison after a guilty verdict from
the first trial.
Because prior defense counsel Fletcher had the benefit
of the knowledge of the diagnoses and could have pursued the
effect of Defendant's mental illness on his actions, as was
testified to by Dr. Carlisle, her failure to raise such a crucial
issue at trial is simply more evidence of the unreasonable and
incompetent manner in which Defendant's defense was conducted.
Issue Three
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF GUN.
State suggests that the chain of custody of the gun was
not an element of the crime.

Defendant concedes this point, but

argues that the issue of how the gun got into the basement the
night Kim Chapman was shot is a crucial issue.

If the Defendant

carried the gun in with him, it is more likely that his
convictions are just; however, if he did not carry the gun in
with him, then one or more of the elements of the crime necessary
for a capital conviction are lacking.
-7-

The State argues that the Defendants actions of
purchasing a gun and practicing shooting prior to the occurrences
leading to the shooting of Kim Chapman, is evidence of his
preparation for committing of a crime.

The State fails to

further explain that the gun purchased by Defendant from Roger
Birt and which was used in the shooting practice (R., 2484-2488)
was not the gun which fired the bullets which killed Kim Chapman.
(See Appellants Brief, Addendum Exhibit 2, page 2 and R., 28812886.)

According to investigator Vic Gabrenas' report, a .38

caliber, RG 31 handgun was found in the hills by Defendants
attorney on directions from the Defendant, with the serial number
ground off.

After restoration of the serial number by the Weber

State College Crime Lab Director, James Gaskill, the serial
number was determined to be Q184020.

This gun was tested and

determined not to be the weapon which killed Kim Chapman.

The

weapon used in the shooting of Chapman had been determined to be
an RG 40 model .38 caliber handgun, which was also re-tested at
the time the RG 31 was tested by Mr. Gaskill, whose original
conclusion was reaffirmed; i.e., that the RG 40 was the weapon
used in the Chapman shooting.

(See page 2 of Exhibit 2.)

The gun which was described as Exhibit 20 throughout
Defendants first trial was obtained from a pawn shop known as
The Gift Shop by Detective Norman Soakai (R., 824-5; see also
Appellant*s Brief, Addendum Exhibit 6, which is a pawn slip used
to obtain Exhibit 20; see also Appellant*s Brief, Addendum
-8-

Exhibit 7/ which is an Affidavit for Search Warrant describing
Exhibit 20 as an RG .38 special handgun, model 40, serial number
P139058).
Mr. Gaskill testified in the Defendants first trial
that Exhibit 20 was the weapon which fired the bullets which
killed Kim Chapman (R., 748-750).
The State would have the Court believe that the
Defendant purchased a gun with the intent of killing Mr. Chapman,
but because there was more than one gun involved in testimony
given at the Defendants trial, the issue of which gun was used
and where it came from is clearly important in determining
criminal liability, if any, against the Defendant.

Defendants

prior counsel ignored these important facts and allowed the State
to gloss over the dilemma the gun issue would have caused to the
jury.
As Defendant has asserted throughout, the gun which
shot Kim Chapman was not brought to the basement of the Chapman
residence by the Defendant, but rather was already there when he
arrived.

Defendant argues that Beverly Jones, the State's main

witness and who was also wounded in the incident, actually
brought the gun to the basement, and that after the shooting,
though wounded, was able to hide the gun until it could be
retrieved and transported back to its owner.

(See Appellant's

Brief, pages 43 and 44.)
The State, in its brief, suggests:
-9-

"...it is unlikely

Beverly could have retrieved and hidden the gun."

(See

Respondent's Brief, p. 11). Apparently, the State is misled in
its belief that once the Defendant left the basement of the
Chapman residence, Earl Chapman, his wife, and the police
subsequently appeared immediately, thus not allowing time for Ms.
Jones to hide the weapon.

However, as Earl Chapman testified in

the Defendant's first trial, he walked downstairs, and after an
initial brief view of the situation, he went back upstairs and
telephoned the police.

In doing so, he initially called the fire

department and was told to call the police.

He then dialed the

number given to him by the fire department and was asked "to hold
on for a minute."

After making the call, he went to the front

door and turned on the porch light, where there was an officer
waiting.

(R., 598-600.)

It is unknown exactly how much time

elapsed from the time Mr. Chapman initially viewed the scene in
the basement after the shooting occurred until the time when he
and the police officer re-entered the basement.

However, several

minutes would have had to have elapsed for him to have called the
fire department and then the police department, and then allow
the police officer into the home and proceed to the basement
Such lapse of time would have given Beverly, who was still
mobile, though wounded (R., 990 and 991), ample time to retrieve
the weapon and hide it in a manner that it was not discovered.
Then, at an early opportunity to enlist the help of an accomplice
to retrieve the weapon and return it to the gun's owner(s).

-10-

(See

further, Appellants Brief, pp. 18-22 and 41-45.)

SUMMARY
Defendant has met his burden to show that his second
trial did not produce a just result.

There are still too many

loose ends and too much evidence that a trier of fact has not had
opportunity to review for one to believe that Defendants trial
was fair and reliable.

A jury with all the facts before it would

not have been able to convict Defendant in the way he was
convicted.

The arguments raised by Defendant do create

reasonable doubt as to the level of crime, if any, that Defendant
committed.

Failing to raise the issues of Defendants mental

illness and the ownership/custody of the gun alone is enough to
demonstrate Attorney FletcherNs deficient performance.
Certainly, failure to present such evidence, when it exists, is
prejudice.

These points, combined with the others raised in

Appellants Brief, resulted in a trial result which is
unreliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 687.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments contained in Appellants Brief
and the Reply herein to the State v s claims, Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to reverse Defendants
conviction and order a new trial .
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ J

day of November,

1990.

ROBERT L. FROERER
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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